Support policy
| Contract | Current development support |
|---|---|
| Go | Exactly 1.26.5 for development and release verification |
| Spice minimum/current | Exact versions in spice-compatibility.json |
| WebSocket implementation | github.com/coder/websocket v1.8.15 |
| Operating systems | Windows, Linux, and macOS |
| Architectures | amd64 and arm64 compilation through public Go APIs |
| Server transport | Caller-owned TLS-enabled http.Server; loopback-only plaintext opt-in |
| Authentication | Required callback or explicit anonymous mode |
| Client transport | Verified wss; loopback-only ws opt-in |
| Release signer | github.com/spice-framework/development/cmd/spice-dev at v0.0.0-20260806132124-4c308d1b9fda |
| Independent verifier | github.com/spice-framework/toolchain/cmd/spice-library-release-verify at v0.0.0-20260806133530-71211498297c |
| Public trust anchor | security/release/ed25519-public.pem, SHA-256 58d664089f3cb42262e491ed1a9e0c30b0f5d3722571f8f74c144afee55882b0 |
spice-compatibility.json is the sole compatibility boundary source. Its
minimum must equal the exact direct Spice requirement in go.mod; its current
value is a forward-compatibility endpoint rather than a moving branch. The
repository gate verifies both boundaries using isolated alternate modfiles,
exact MVS selection, vet, and shuffled race tests without modifying product or
module files. A release may raise the minimum only through an intentional
module and compatibility-contract change with green minimum/current evidence.
The starter supports complete text and binary WebSocket messages, subprotocols, ping, bounded no-context-takeover compression, graceful close, and payload-free session observations. Application message codecs, reconnection, delivery guarantees, session stores, authorization policy, routers, and HTTP/TLS server ownership remain outside this starter and must be composed explicitly.
Release artifacts are produced only from an exact tagged commit under the
contract in releasing.md. A compromised or missing signing
secret fails a production release; it never falls back to unsigned output.
The pinned central signer and independent verifier are the protected production path. Windows and Linux CI render the same inert central plan twice under vendor-only offline resolution and require byte-identical unsigned artifacts.
The committed public trust anchor is reviewed verification material. Its
fingerprint is the SHA-256 digest of the DER SubjectPublicKeyInfo bytes. The
matching private key is stored only as the repository Actions secret
SPICE_LIBRARY_RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY and is passed through the caller’s one-name
secret mapping. The protected release-signing environment remains the human
approval gate and contains no signing secret. These configured controls do not
establish that a version tag or published release exists.